John Rapley - Foreign Focus SINCE THE Iraq invasion, Afghanistan has disappeared to the back pages of newspapers. It may soon get more attention, though. Al Qaeda and its protector, the Taliban militia, both of which the US invasion of Afghanistan was meant to crush, are resurfacing.
In the case of the Taliban, recent reports suggest that thousands of fighters are living openly on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border. From there, they cross freely into Afghanistan to attack government forces and their foreign backers. When pursued, the Taliban retreat into Pakistan, making pursuit difficult.
Pakistan's borderlands have long been notorious for coming under Islamabad's sovereignty in name only. Local elites exercise effective control, and traditions of hospitality, ethnic ties and ideological affinity conspire to make them receptive to the Taliban. Given the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, the government of Pervez Musharraf cannot afford the political risks of a forceful campaign against the Taliban.
There is an additional problem. During the years in which the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, the Americans funnelled assistance to Afghan warlords through Pakistan s version of the CIA, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). At the time, both the ISI and Pakistan's armed forces were coming increasingly under the sway of Islamic fundamentalism, something the alliance with Afghanistan's Muslim rebels aided. However, Cold War politics led the Americans to turn a blind eye to the ascent of Pakistani Islamism; it was just too important to Washington to defeat the Soviets.
When the Soviets left Afghanistan, for reasons to do with regional politics, the ISI became a key backer of the Taliban. That support continued right up to the time of the US invasion. But when President Musharraf threw his country's weight behind the US-led war on terror, support for the Taliban was officially cut.
FRIENDSHIPS, ALLIANCES
Officially, unofficially, old alliances and friendships would not wither so easily. Today, it is believed that many within the ISI and Pakistani military continue to support the Taliban. Given the fragility of President Musharraf's rule, he is hard-pressed to carry out the sort of purge that would be needed to isolate the Taliban. Then there is the matter of al Qaeda's flight to the west. The Washington Post recently reported that al Qaeda operatives, possibly led by Osama bin Laden's son, are operating in eastern Iran under the protection of an Iranian militia. The militia, in turn, answers not to the government which has been co-operating with the Americans in rooting out al Qaeda fighters but to religious hardliners. The hardliners, who are locked in a struggle with the government over who should run Iran, have a completely different agenda. Whereas the government wants to improve relations with the US, the hardliners are doing all they can to export the Islamic revolution.
For the time being, these threats will probably remain localised. Rhetoric aside, the Taliban are a long way from returning to power in Kabul. The most they will do is escalate attacks in the south of the country, frustrating the Afghan state's efforts to impose its sovereignty there. As for the new al Qaeda base, the organisation's capabilities have been considerably degraded, and it seems likely that for the time being its activities will be confined to the region.
Nevertheless, what it means is that US hopes of a quick victory in Afghanistan, followed by a rapid exit, have been dashed. And to the extent the US, in particular, finds its forces bogged down in a long, wearying, war a scenario that is also looking increasingly likely in Iraq the long-term costs to the US of this war will continue rising.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
