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Haiti: Why CARICOM needs answers
published: Sunday | March 14, 2004


Delano Franklyn, Contributor

THE RECENT developments in Haiti have led to questions being asked about whether or not CARICOM could have done more to address the situation. There are also those who argue that President Aristide voluntarily resigned and as a result see CARICOM's request for an investigation by the United Nations as a waste of time.

I will give some indications as to why CARICOM has called for an investigation into the circumstances leading to Aristide's departure on the morning of February 29, 2004.

Haiti is a close neighbour with which we have had a long and close relationship. Haiti is also the newest member of CARICOM, and a fragile democracy which CARICOM has a responsibility to nurture. With this in mind, Prime Minister P.J Patterson, in his capacity as Chairman of CARICOM, wrote to President Aristide on December 30, 2003, outlining among other things, CARICOM's desire to get a better understanding of the reasons for the political upheaval with a view to "contributing towards a solution acceptable to all parties in Haiti."

It will be recalled that for a long time CARICOM had been working along with the Organisation of American States (OAS) to achieve political stability and social and economic development in Haiti. For various reasons, this approach did not yield the expected results. Patterson's proposal therefore that a CARICOM fact-finding mission visit Haiti to have discussions with all parties concerned was accepted by Aristide.

FACT-FINDING MISSION

The fact-finding mission visited Haiti from January 5-7. It met with a wide spectrum of representative groups, including members of the political opposition and members of the business and religious communities. It became clear that there was a deep division between the Opposition and the President. So deep was the division that members of the Opposition refused to have any form of dialogue or negotiations with Aristide. CARICOM Heads used the opportunity of their attendance at the Special Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico from January 12-14, 2004 to meet with President Aristide and inform him of findings as reported by the fact-finding mission.

In view of the reported unwillingness of the "legitimate opposition" to sit around the same table as the President, a group of CARICOM Prime Ministers decided to meet separately with the opposition groups and then again with President Aristide and his party representatives.

On January 20-21, CARICOM Prime Ministers met in Nassau, The Bahamas, with representatives of the Haitian Opposition. The decision was taken by CARICOM to invite as observers to that meeting, representatives of the United States of America, Canada and the Organisation of American States. These countries, along with the OAS, were involved in every other meeting thereafter. The meeting with the Opposition in the Bahamas was extremely challenging as the Opposition insisted that they had no intention of discussing any proposal which did not call for the removal of President Aristide. At that same meeting the CARICOM Prime Ministers outlined a Plan which contained, as its main elements, the endorsement of the full application of democracy in Haiti; no acceptance of a coup in any form; that any change must be in accordance with the Constitution; and that CARICOM would accept the voluntary resignation of President Aristide, if he so chooses, before the end of his term.

CARICOM DELEGATION

Immediately after that meeting, a high level CARICOM delegation led by Prime Minister Christie of the Bahamas visited Haiti on January 28, to outline to President Aristide the CARICOM proposal emerging from the Nassau meeting with the Opposition, and to invite President Aristide to meet with a representative group of CARICOM Prime Ministers in Jamaica later that week.

The Prime Ministers met with President Aristide on January 31 in Kingston. The group of observers was expanded to include the European Union. The proposals emanating out of that meeting followed very closely the proposals which were discussed with the Opposition in the Bahamas the week before. The document which emerged became known as the CARICOM Action Plan. It was accepted in full by President Aristide.

DECLARATION OF QUEBEC CITY

The Plan was predicated on the non-removal of the elected President of Haiti by unconstitutional means. This position was taken in keeping with the Inter-American Democratic Charter which was adopted by countries of the region in September 2001. The Charter reflects in part, the Declaration of Quebec City, which was adopted at the 3rd Summit of the Americas held from April 20-21, 2001.

A section of that Declaration reads:

"The maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict rules for the democratic system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment and are an essential condition of our presence at this the future Summit. Consequently, any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the Summit of the Americas process."

TRIPARTITE COUNCIL

The CARICOM Action Plan also called for the creation of a Tripartite Council to be made up of representatives from the international community, civil society and government. This Tripartite Council would vet the persons proposed as members of the Council of Eminent Persons. A new Prime Minister would be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of Eminent Persons. Thereafter, there would be the formation of a new government. This would be done by the new Prime Minister who would select a Council of Ministers in consultation with the President and Council of Eminent Persons. The CARICOM Plan also called for the professionalisation of the Haitian police force and the disarmament of strong-arm groups.

It must be noted that:

All parties agreed that the President would not be removed undemocratically and that he would serve out his tenure which expired in early 2006, unless he choose to voluntarily resign.

All parties, including the international partners, agreed to the principle of a shared government.

The Plan was binding on both the President as well as the Opposition.

No element of the Plan could have been implemented without both the President and the Opposition acting in concert.

After the elaboration of this Plan, a high-level CARICOM delegation visited Haiti on February 3-4 to apprise opposition groups of the outcome of the meeting involving CARICOM, the international Partners and President Aristide. The Opposition remained unmoved by President Aristide's commitment to the Plan and reiterated its refusal to negotiate or enter into any form of discussion with him. Thereafter, the situation in Haiti worsened. On February 5, 2004, an armed group seized control of Gonaives in the north of Haiti and threatened to take control of other areas.

WASHINGTON MEETING

This new development, as well as CARICOM's commitment to keep the United States and other partners of CARICOM informed, prompted a CARICOM delegation to meet with the Secretary General of the OAS, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the US Secretary of State, representatives of France and the European Union in Washington on February 13.

Overwhelming support was once again given by all the partners for the CARICOM Action Plan. As a result, a decision was taken to send a broad delegation to Haiti on February 21 to discuss the Plan, once again, with the President and the Opposition. It should be noted that by this time it was no longer a CARICOM Plan but an International Plan of Action which sought to accelerate the process within the context of the CARICOM framework.

The President reiterated his willingness to accept the Plan but the Opposition again rejected it on the grounds that it did not allow for the departure of the President. The Opposition also expressed reservation about the implementation of the Plan. As a result of this reservation, CARICOM and its international partners developed a 'Statement of Guarantors' which stated that the partners and CARICOM would guarantee the implementation of the Plan, once both the Opposition and President Aristide agreed to be bound by it. The situation deteriorated further thereafter, as rebel forces had by then captured other areas of Haiti. The humanitarian situation was also spinning out of control with Jamaica opening up its doors to more than 100 Haitians who had turned up on its shores.

As a result of the stalemate in Haiti and with rebel forces fanning the flames in sections of the country, Jamaica on behalf of CARICOM asked for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. Jamaica in its submission at that meeting which took place on February 26, outlined the "immediate need for the Security Council to authorise urgent deployment of a multi-national force to assist in the restoration of law and order, to facilitate a return to stability and to create an environment in which the continuing efforts to find a solution to the political crisis can be
pursued."

The Council took no action then but did issue a Presidential Statement indicating that an international security presence would be contingent on a political settlement. On the morning of February 29, three days after the meeting of the Security Council, news came that President Aristide had departed office.

The Security Council met in an emergency session that afternoon and adopted Resolution 1529 which, inter alia, authorised the immediate deployment of a multi-national interim force to Haiti for three months. It cannot be argued that the Security Council was acting on the basis of the request made by CARICOM the Thursday before as the central plank of CARICOM's request was based on the concept of shared government, not regime change.

It is very clear from the outline of the sequence of events, that CARICOM did everything possible to bring about a meaningful solution to the situation in Haiti.

VOLUNTARY OR FORCED ACTION

Did President Aristide voluntarily leave office, or was he forced to do so? There are two views on this matter. There is the view that "he (President Aristide) made the decision to resign". There is the other view which was raised by the Chairman of CARICOM P.J. Patterson on February 29, 2004 that, in light of the circumstances which led to his departure, "CARICOM is bound to question whether his resignation was truly voluntarily." This expression of doubt was further underlined in a statement issued by the Heads of CARICOM on March 3, 2004 in which they "expressed dismay and alarm over the events leading to the departure from office by President Aristide."

The dismay and alarm expressed by CARICOM Heads are based on sound judgment and a dispassionate analysis of all the information available to them at the time. The information they had, raised more questions than answers. Why?

In discussions with Prime Minister Patterson on Thursday, February 26, and Minister K. D. Knight on the afternoon of Saturday, February 28, the evening before his departure, President Aristide made it known that he had no intention of voluntarily resigning.

President Aristide, who had several discussions by telephone with Mr. Randall Robinson on Saturday, February 28, 2004 also told him that he had no intention to resign. Indeed, Mr. Robinson, with whom Aristide had several discussions each day, did not know that Aristide had departed from office until he heard it on the news the following morning.

At no point in time did President Aristide communicate with any of his CARICOM colleagues to inform them of his departure from office. It is interesting that there are reports indicating that President Aristide called his colleagues. It would be interesting to find out who placed the calls and to whom.

It is reported that some time was spent 'trying to find a country willing to provide asylum for Aristide'. Why did Aristide need a 'country' to ask for asylum on his behalf?

In a statement issued by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda on February 29, it was revealed that a request was made for a technical stop by an aircraft at the VC Bird International Airport. The statement explained that the captain of the aircraft, when asked by the Immigration Department, denied that there were any passengers aboard. The 'declaration form' which was filled out and submitted to the Immigration Department in Antigua also indicated that no passengers were on board. It later turned out that President Aristide was on board. Why the misinformation, if President Aristide's resignation were voluntary?

President Aristide has said that he was kidnapped. Others have said he was not. This issue cannot be left unanswered.

It is for the above reasons and more why CARICOM has asked the United Nations to conduct an investigation into this matter. Trying to unearth the truth, no matter how painful it may be for some, cannot be regarded as a waste of time.

CARICOM's position on Haiti has always been based on the principles of democracy and its actions have been characterised by openness and transparency. It is in keeping with this that it is important for the people of CARICOM to know exactly what transpired in Haiti in the early morning of February 29.

Delano Franklyn is the Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade

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