Robert Buddan, Contributor
BUILDING DEMOCRACY requires time and sensible institutional design. Like any other activity, democracy needs an infrastructure on which to start up and run. This infrastructure should include citizenship participation; civilian supremacy over the military; workable election laws and administration; responsive governance and responsible constitutionalism; and political parties and a competitive party system.
The recent experiences of our neighbours in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (DR) are instructive. The latter is to hold presidential elections in May and indications are that there is going to be controversy. Democracy requires a supportive political culture and a certain level of economic development. But it also requires appropriate institutional design.
Both Haiti and the DR have had fairly new constitutions. Older constitutions have failed. When George W. Bush sent marines into Haiti last week, he said "The Haitian Constitution is working." It wasn't and isn't. The Constitution (of 1987) promised to "implant democracy" and "establish a strong and stable state". This could not have been achieved in such a short time.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Under the Haitian constitution of 1987 and the DR's constitution of 1994, the president cannot serve two consecutive terms (subsequently changed in the DR). These restrictions were designed to avoid executive dictatorships as occurred under François and Jean Claude Duvalier who both ruled Haiti as presidents for life for almost 30 years and were only removed by death and exile. In the DR, Joaquin Balaguer ruled for 22 years between 1966 and 1994 and his rule ended only when fraudulent elections were held under proper supervision. Balaguer continued to seek election until shortly before his death at 95 when he was already blind, deaf and could hardly walk.
However, these restrictions concentrated on curbing old traditions rather than encouraging new democratic ones. The democratic election of the popular Aristide was frustrated by overthrow and then after his restoration, the limitation of only serving out the remaining two years of his first term. He could not seek re-election in 1996 although he would have easily won. In the DR, Leonel Fernandez won elections in 1996 but could not seek re-election in 2000 even though the DR averaged eight per cent growth under his presidency. The constitutions suffocated democratically elected presidents. Term limits are fine but when they are too restrictive they frustrate government. Not surprisingly, the DR changed the constitution in 2002 to allow presidents to be eligible for two consecutive terms.
MAJORITARIAN ELECTIONS
In both countries, the president must be elected by absolute majority. This means that if a candidate gets 45 per cent of the vote (less than a majority), the elections have to be held again between himself and the next best candidate. In 2000, Hipolito Mejia of the DR got 49 per cent of the votes and was only deemed elected right away when the other two candidates with much less withdrew. In 1996, Pena Gomez won 46 per cent and had to have a run-off election. But he lost to Fernandez who had placed second in the first round. The third placed candidate (Balaguer, who had been eliminated) asked his supporters to vote for Fernandez against Pena Gomez. Pena Gomez was black and a racial pact was formed by the other two Hispanic leaderships against him.
In fact, this majoritarian system was instituted in 1994 to help keep Pena Gomez out and for the two more conservative parties to gang up when necessary to keep the strongest party, the social democratic party out. This serves the same purpose in Haiti. However, Aristide and Preval had been able to win absolute majorities outright. Still, the majoritarian principle helps less electable candidates who can gang up to beat the most popular candidate. When constitutions are constructed to play political games they create anger and strain on the political system. The ambitions of parties are served over the objectives of democracy.
MIDTERM AND CONCURRENT ELECTIONS
In Haiti and the DR, the new constitutions required that midterm legislative elections be held in-between presidential elections. This has caused three kinds of problems. The president's party might fail to win a majority or lose it in midterm causing his government to be ineffective. Fernandez's party did not even win a majority in the 1996 legislative elections and failed to do so in 1998. It had to depend on other parties to pass laws.
Another problem is that midterm elections have low voter turn-outs compared to concurrent elections when legislature and executive are elected together. In the DR's midterm elections of 1998 the turnout was an estimated 52 per cent, the highest rate of abstention ever recorded in the country. Analysts believed that the low turnout reflected the decision to hold, for the first time, separate legislative and presidential elections. When Haiti held midterm elections in 1997, the estimate though unreliable, was that voter turn-out was as low as five per cent but no higher than 30 per cent. US midterm elections also have low voter turn-outs.
A third problem is that when there are midterm elections, the country is on a perennial election footing, making longer-term planning difficult. Although the DR nominally has four-year presidential and parliamentary terms, by splitting the elections for the two, the country appears to reside in a continuous state of electioneering. The uncertainty creates inevitably delays in policy and legislation is often stalled to take advantage of election cycles. This is also true for Haiti.
Institutional design might complicate rather than enhance democracy. One scholar of the DR said: "(T)he features of the country's current constitutional framework and electoral calendar appear to complicate governance in the country more than to enhance it...(H)olding congressional elections at the midterm of the presidential term it is more likely that presidents may never achieve effective governing majorities".
Following the May 2000 election in the DR there were calls for a constitutional commission to be established to find a solution to this problem. The hope was to have presidential and legislative elections concurrently, thereby instituting four-year terms for both.
In 2002 a majority of Dominican legislators voted for constitutional reform to include presidential re-election and concurrent executive and legislative elections. They also sought to change the majoritarian system so that a candidate could win with 40 per cent if this was greater than that achieved by his opponents.
HAITI'S DIFFICULTIES
In Haiti, the situation is really more complicated. The president is elected by majority but then has to appoint a prime minister who has to be approved by a majority in both the upper and lower Houses. Haiti has gone through many prime ministers and unstable government because candidates have failed to win or maintain support in the legislature.
Furthermore, Haiti's legislature must also be elected by majority rule. Haitian law says that to win in the first round, a candidate must get 50 per cent plus one vote. If not, the top two finishers meet in the second round. In 2000, officials counted all the ballots cast, and then discarded all but the four top vote-getters. Critics say counting only the top contenders violated electoral law. This dispute was at the heart of Haiti's controversy in 2000. Nine senate seats, according to one view of the counting rules, should have gone to a second round. The confusion lay in the formula for counting.
There are simpler rules and procedures that countries like Haiti and the Dominican Republic should consider, at least, until they have a stronger infrastructure for democracy. Of more than 100 electoral systems, 27 use the majoritarian formula, 22 use proportional representation but 67 use plurality (First-Past-the-Post). Plurality (the person who gets the most votes wins) is simple and avoids costly and administratively stressful second round elections.
MILITARY LEADERS
In presidential systems where a president can select his cabinet from non-elected members, he is free to select military leaders to important departments (as is regularly done in the DR and used to be the case in Haiti). This does not ensure civilian supremacy. Concurrent elections also help voter turn-out and put less strain on the electoral administration while providing stronger government. As I keep insisting, we cannot apply what works for say, the United States, Canada, Australia or France to poorer countries with less democratic experience and more fragile democratic assets. Hopefully, Haiti and the DR will get their constitutions to work or make their constitutions more workable with realistic and more simple rules.
Robert Buddan lecturers in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona. E-Mail: Robert.Buddan@uwimona.edu.jm.
