John Rapley - FOREIGN FOCUSEACH YEAR at this time, I come here to France to teach a course on globalisation at one of UWI's partner universities. The south of France has been an interesting place from which to behold some of the dramatic events of the last few weeks, including the Madrid bombings, the Spanish elections, and the rising tensions in the Middle East.
But it was geopolitical tensions on the other side of the globe that impressed themselves upon me in a recent class. The student body here is fairly multinational, and among my students have been some young Chinese. The other day, when I was discussing the national election in Taiwan, one of them said "But sir, why do you call Taiwan a nation? It is a province of China."
Although this is the official position in Beijing, this young lady was not simply enunciating the party-line. Nothing else in her countenance or comments suggested a particular attachment to what remains of Chinese communism. She, along with her classmates, was expressing what is the deeply-held conviction of most Han Chinese.
NATIONALISTS
The Han Chinese make up the vast majority of China's population. When the communists chased the nationalist government off the mainland in 1949, the nationalists fled to the island province of Formosa, or Taiwan. There, the Kuomintang (KMT) which translates roughly as Nation People's Party -- reconstituted a government with the plan of eventually re-invading the mainland and beating back the communists.
Many mainlanders followed the KMT to Taiwan. Over the next few decades, Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, jostled with Beijing over who was the legitimate government of China. Over time, more and more of the world's governments began to see that the claims of the KMT to the rest of China were unrealistic, and so recognized the Beijing communists as the legitimate government of China. Today, there are only a few countries which still accept the Taipei administration as the government of China.
Interestingly, Beijing's claim to be the government of China is coming to be accepted by many in Taiwan, albeit not in a way that brings comfort to Beijing. The Han Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949 still seek an eventual reunification with China, and have provided the backbone of support for the KMT. However, much of Taiwan's indigenous population is now openly questioning the goal of reunification.
After all, despite my young lady's objections, the island has operated essentially as an independent country for the last half-century. Its economy has boomed in that time, giving Taiwan a much higher per capita income than the mainland (indeed, many scholars maintain that Beijing adopted market reforms precisely because it felt the need to catch up with Taiwan). And, since the late 1990s, the island has enjoyed a democratic system. What, wonder many Taiwanese, could the island possibly gain from reunification?
This local population, which resented the dominance of Han Chinese during the period of KMT rule, has provided the support base for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP has become increasingly open about its desire to somehow lead the way towards secession. Its victory in Sunday's presidential election has thus renewed tensions between Taipei and Beijing.
OPEN CONFLICT
For the time being, there is little risk of open conflict between Taiwan and the mainland. Having won the election by the narrowest of margins, and facing opposition demands for investigations into the election's conduct, President Chen Shui-bian enjoys little mandate for decisive action. Moreover, Taiwan's security is underwritten by the United States, whose government shows little appetite for Taiwanese secession. In these circumstances, President Chen is likely to soft-pedal secession in the coming months.
Nonetheless, China and Taiwan look set for a head-on collision one day. The secessionists in Taiwan are an expanding and increasingly assertive constituency. They are not likely to tolerate a 'softly-softly' approach indefinitely. When I asked my students if they thought that Taiwan would one day attempt to secede, they admitted it was looking increasingly probable. And when I asked how Beijing would respond, they left little doubt: Beijing would enjoy the backing of its people in re-taking Taiwan by force, if it ever came to that.
The tensions across the Taiwan Strait thus look sure to rise in the years ahead.
John Rapley is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona.
