Stephen Vasciannie
IN THE UNITED STATES of America, a whole battalion of lawyers and journalists can be expected to review decisions of the Supreme Court, and to present sundry analyses of what each pronouncement from that country's highest court may mean in practice. In the United Kingdom, some judgments of the House of Lords - such as last year's decision on unlawful detention - are also subject to extensive public commentary. Thus, we can expect a steady stream of argumentation about the jurisprudential implications of different American and English court decisions.
In the Caribbean, the situation is different. Of course, in some instances, public commentary will dwell excessively on some court decisions, though in some instances, where the court decision pertains to politically sensitive issues, this is quite understandable. It is also understandable when something dramatic happens have we not all argued and over-argued the point about whether that forthright judicial 'buff' was well-deserved? But the Caribbean situation is different because in some instances the media does not give detailed treatment to decisions of the Privy Council - still our final court - on matters pertaining to other Caribbean jurisdictions.
EXTRADITION
About a month ago, the Privy Council delivered its judgment in the case of Noel Heath and Glenroy Matthew v. The Government of the United States of America ((2005) UKPC 45). This case from St. Kitts-Nevis concerned extradition. Heath and Matthew, two Kittitian citizens, were wanted by the American authorities for trial on conspiracy to supply and import cocaine to the U.S.A.
In 1996, the magistrate who heard the case concerning the committal for trial of Heath and Matthew concluded that there was insufficient evidence, and thus ordered their release. This decision was overturned by the High Court in St. Kitts, but the magistrate failed to give full respect to the High Court decision, on the basis that the order of the High Court was ambiguous. The matter eventually reached the Privy Council, a decision was given, and indications were that Heath and Matthew would be extradited to the U.S.A.
As is their right, however, Heath and Matthew then raised additional points about the lawfulness of their extradition, and pursued those points back to the Privy Council. This is, broadly speaking, a somewhat unremarkable set of facts. What is striking, however, is the manner in which the Privy Council handled the case when it came to their Lordships for the second time. And here, I am referring, not to the substance of the Privy Council's decision, but rather to the style, it almost appears as if their Lordships were angry that the case had returned to them.
'WHOLLY UNPERSUADED'
For example, after noting some of the background circumstances in the case, their Lordships opined: "Nothing daunted, the appellants continued to resist their extradition by all means available." Is it not natural that they should do so; and if it is natural, why is it necessary for the Privy Council to comment on this course of action.
Similarly, in considering the submissions made on behalf of the appellants the Privy Council found that it was "wholly unpersuaded" by one argument. And, concerning another submission, their Lordships emphasised "there is nothing in this argument." Likewise, the Privy Council noted that it "would be very remarkable" if a certain proposition were to be accepted, that "there is simply no merit" in two additional arguments made by the appellants, and that for another, "this is an impossible argument".
Finally, the Privy Council summarises: "their Lordships conclude that there is nothing in any of the grounds of appeal and no substantial reasons advanced why these extradition proceedings should not now be brought to a speedy and final conclusion."
All of this is particularly strong language for a court that is legendary for its courtesy and temperament. The court even throws in some sarcasm. In rejecting the contention that the Foreign Kingpin Designation Act would lead to a denial of justice for the appellants, the Privy Council pointed out that the Kingpin Act was passed in June 2000, and yet "the full implications" of the Act were not clear to the appellants' lawyer until February 2004.
Lawyers are obliged to look to the substance of judicial decisions for guidance as to the future. But in this case, the Privy Council appears - through the unusually robust style adopted - to be sending a stronger signal: don't waste our time with frivolous arguments.
Stephen Vasaciannie is a professor at the University of the West Indies and a consultant in the Attorney General's chambers.
