Ian Boyne

"America is between two fires. If it stays in Iraq, it will bleed to death; if it leaves, it will lose everything. "

-Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2004.

In a paper just released by the prestigious United States Council on Foreign Relations, After the Surge: the Case for U.S. Military Disengagement From Iraq, Professor Steven Simon makes a compelling and tightly- reasoned case for U.S. military withdrawal over the next 12 to 18 months. Simon freely admits that the U.S. will lose some face by the withdrawal but he feels "some disasters are irretrievable".

Says Simon: "Having staked its prestige on the intervention and failed to achieve many of its objectives, the United States will certainly pay a price for military disengagement from Iraq. But if the United States manages its departure from Iraq carefully, it will not have to lose everything. Rather, the United States will have preserved the opportunity to recover vital assets that its campaign in Iraq imperilled: diplomatic initiative, global reputation and the well-being and political utility of its ground forces".

Simon's paper is a must-read for anyone who wants a serious analysis of the U.S.' options in Iraq at this time. Reflecting his inter-disciplinary training, including an MTS from Harvard Divinity School, the Georgetown University professor (who is also a fellow at Oxford and Brown universities) outlines and debunks the major arguments put forward by the Bush administration and its supporters for continued commitment to the Iraqi project. Simon disarms by openly conceding to his opponents that "military disengagement will be a severe blow to the United States which staked its prestige and defined its security on the basis of a war to disarm Iraq and transform its politics. Disengaging will signify the inability to achieve these strategic goals. American resolve will likely be questioned. In the near to medium term this could make it harder, perhaps much harder, to influence Middle Eastern governments when Washington most needs their cooperation to stabilise Iraq and push back against Iran." So Simon faces the music of his ideological combatants. Not to dance but to wait his turn at the turntable, as it were.

At the controls

He is now at the controls: "The dismal irony is this: Proponents of an indefinitecommitment of U.S. forces seek above all to preserve the core of American interest in demonstrating resolve; but that demonstration cannot ultimately be sustained and in any case has been devalued by the fundamentally flawed nature of the intervention and its aftermath. The jihadists already believe that they have won, while Iran is convinced that it has the upper hand, despite the tenacity of the U.S. troops on the ground".

The U.S. is already losing the war, with no reasonable or foreseeable chance of winning, so it is purely delusionary to pretend otherwise, Simon advises. There comes a time when a Great Power has to know how to pull back. He quotes the seminal foreign policy thinker and father of the Containment Doctrine, George Kennan, as telling the 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "there is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant and unpromising objectives". If only the Bush administration would swallow its pride, reach for some common sense and demonstrate the courage to make a belated retreat. After the Surge carefully sets out how it can be done.

But not before he carefully and surgically analyses all the rationalisations for the war. Blasting the intervention in Iraq as "ill-informed and ill-prepared", Professor Simon says this "unleashed the horrors of the past four years." Referring to what he calls the issue of moral obligation, he says the U.S. has incurred "the duty to leave Iraqis no worse off than on the day of the invasion and if possible better off." But he says, "The bleak truth remains that the United States is incapable of restoring Iraq even to the relative stability of the Baathist era, let alone the comparatively Edenic condition of Egypt or Jordan.

Bleaker truth

"The even bleaker truth is that continued U.S. military operations on Iraqi territory might well leave Iraqis even worse off. In that light for the U.S. government to sacrifice the livesof its soldiers in the pursuit of an unattainable objective (a stable, pluralistic Ira with U.S. interests) or an inappropriate one (reputation for toughness and reliability) would be the least morally defensible course for Washington to take."

Simon displays a keen familiarity with the dynamics of the various factions, forces and interests in Iraq. Winning the war is not just a matter of having adequate troops.

"Even if the United States had the abundant forces and reconstruction teams necessary, it is not clear that the situation in Iraq today is retrievable. Twenty-three years of Saddam's rule had already hollowed out Iraq's middle class. U.S. intervention decapitated its leadership, swept aside its remaining institutions and created the security vacuum that empowered militias and reduced society to a state of Hobbesian misery".

Misdiagnosis

After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq confronts "the illusion that an American victory can be retrieved", dismissing it as a "misdiagnosis of Iraq's tragedy". The problem is not that al-Qaida and Iran are working to destabilise an essentially responsible, moderate Iraqi centre. It is not just a matter of U.S. forces defeating external threats, as the Bush administration's propaganda suggests. The President's announcement of his new initiatives in Iraq is premised on that misguided assumption. Does Iran really have an interest in an unstable, fractious Iraq or would it not prefer a consolidated, Shia-controlled one or one where the Shias have a commanding presence?

Iran can be induced to work toward a stable Iran. And so can Syria. The U.S. should, therefore, step up its efforts for a d'tente with Iran and Syria, engaging enemies, as U.S. policy had traditionally done. (There is increasing pressure on the Bush administration to do so, including an essay in the March - April issue of the respected Foreign Affairs).

"The more supportable view is that turmoil in Iraq is due largely to internal forces. The annihilation civil society bya succession of disasters-Baathist rule, sanctions, invasion-has closed off the near-to medium-term possibility of normal, national politics".

This is a crucial point and one which the Bush administration ignores to its peril. U.S. objectives cannot be achieved unless there can be a vibrant civil society in Iraq. The strong opposition to U.S. presence in Iraq noted by the Iraq Study Group , this council report and several polls - means that the U.S. has no legitimacy there.

In the March/April issue of Foreign Affairs ('Iraq's Civil War') the Geballe professor at Stanford University, James D. Fearon, says, "the Bush Administration's political objective in Iraq - creating a stable, peaceful somewhat democratic regime that can survive the departure of U.S. troops - is unrealistic. Given this unrealistic political objective, military strategy of any sort is doomed to fail almost regardless of whatever the administration does with the 'surge' option - or shifts toward a pure training, as advised by the Iraq Study Group".

The new Council on Foreign Relations report seems the most realistic and balanced of all the reports issued on the Iraq situation and it steers a middle course between those calling for immediate withdrawal and those calling for long-term commitment. The council's report is certainly far better than the one issued last month by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies titled The New Bush Strategy for Iraq: What are the Chances of 'Victory'.

The council report is comprehensive in its reach and manifests a keen understanding of contrary positions and the main lines of argumentation by the Bush administration. The spectre of Iraq descending into greater chaos as a result of U.S. troop withdrawal is faced clearly by this new council report, but it shows that U.S. military presence would not guarantee a prevention of this scenario. Even the Baker-led Iraq Study Group begins its assessment with these grim words: "There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire".The Government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering and the daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive".

If stability is maintained under Shia rule, the Sunnis will be estranged and if the Shias are pushed toward more power sharing with the Sunnis they will be upset and then there is there is the intractable Kurdish problem. Plus the myriad militias and criminal gangs.

Sixty-one per cent of Iraqis approve of attacks against Americans and 79 per cent believe the influence of Americans is mostly negative in their country. It's a no-win situation except through timely withdrawal and diplomatic initiatives.

Already achieved

"The United States has already achieved all that it is likely to achieve in Iraq: the removal of Saddam, the end of the Baathist regime, the elimination of the Iraqi regional threat and the opening of a door, however narrow, to a constitutionally based democracy." Well put. The U.S. should celebrate those successes and cut its losses.

But it is the decline in support for the war at home which will make the decisive influence on Washington. "The American public will not long tolerate casualties if its sees its leaders openly divided about the stakes, and they have lost faith in the possibility of victory."

Says Professor Simon: "U.S. interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region can be more effectively advanced if the United States disengages from Iraq. Indeed, the sooner Washington grasps this nettle, the sooner it can begin to repair the damage that has been done to America's international position".

Is anybody listening in Washington?

Ian Boyne is a veteran journalist who may be reached at ianboyne1@yahoo.com.