Iran ascendant

It may be that, from Washington's perspective, the worst has passed in the Middle East. Allies in Egypt and Tunisia have been toppled, and the unrest continues spreading.

But while relations between Libya and the United States have improved in recent years, it would be a stretch to say the Americans will be sad if Moammar Gaddafi goes. Meanwhile, their crucial allies in the region, the Gulf states, have one decisive advantage that Egypt and Tunisia did not: oil wealth, and the ability to buy off the people should they grow restive.

Nonetheless, if the tide of rebellion does not topple any of the region's monarchies à and it is still premature to predict that outcome with confidence à nonetheless, the last month has not been a good one for US foreign policy. It has suffered a major strategic setback in the Middle East. As the dust of these revolutions settles, the US will need to go back to the drawing board and plan a new future, but from a weakened position.

This is because the one clear winner from the events of the last few weeks is America's arch-nemesis in the Middle East, Iran. It is not that the rebels are lining up behind Iran, or motivated by its Islamic model of revolution. Far from it. But the rebellion has toppled American allies, and is likely to deliver regimes that are at least marginally less friendly to both the US and its close friend, Israel.

Meanwhile, although Iran con-tinues to have a discontented opposition of its own to contend with, nonetheless for the time being, none of Iran's regional friends have suffered any setbacks. Indeed, Lebanon's Hezbollah, which works closely with Tehran, recently forced a change in government in Beirut. In Gaza, Hamas has likely seen fate smile on it. The movement, which runs the impoverished territory, will likely be able to breathe some life into its economy, which has been stifled by a blockade, for the Egyptian border is likely to become more open now. And in Iraq, Tehran has gained a measure of influence it could never have dreamed of in the days of Saddam Hussein.

So Iran has held its ground, while the US has seen its allies retreat. This will ensure that tensions within the region remain high. For one thing, Iran reportedly continues to develop its nuclear programme, and Israel is anxious to put an end to it. This is hardly surprising: Iran's president has mused publicly that the world would be better off without Israel.

Israel is still mulling the idea of sending warplanes to bomb Iran's nuclear sites, possibly backed up by commando attacks. An Israeli operation, which would stoke fury in the region at the best of times, could now take place in a moment when the balance of governmental opinion across the region has turned further against Israel.

So if Israel bombs Iran, it can expect a low-level war to break out, as Iran's allies in Gaza and Lebanon rain missiles down on the country. Quietly, several governments will encourage Israel, since they, too, feel threatened by Iran. Publicly, they will decry the action, and the voices from Cairo may be more condemnatory than in the past. Iran may also feel sufficiently emboldened to retaliate with missile strikes of its own.

Therefore, the context in which Israel might attack its enemy has shifted considerably against it. Nonetheless, Israel will not worry overmuch about what the impact of an attack on Iran whould have on its relations with either its regional counterparts, or the US. The current government considers Tehran's nuclear programme an existential threat, one that the country should be willing to go down fighting against.

It's a safe bet that any calm in the Middle East will just amount to periods of respite, in-between persistent instability and volatility. We might as well get used to paying plenty for gas at the pumps, because high oil prices are going to be with us for a while.

 John Rapley is the Bradlow fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com and rapley.john@gmail.com.