JLP's defeat: an insider's perspective

TIME TO REFLECT

There is a lot to reflect on going forward. Rather than engage in senseless blame games, the JLP must continue its deep introspection and quickly move to start a comprehensive assessment to determine what went so wrong and correct whatever gaps existed. Already, G2K has begun its comprehensive assessment that will focus on the organisation's philosophy and core values, internal management/secretariat, media relations, internal communication, recruitment/succession planning and electioneering activities.

As we reflect on December 29, there are a number of things that immediately jump out at you. For one to see performing and organised members of parliament, ministers and party deputy leaders like Dr Christopher Tufton and Bobby Montague lose their seats, a most rigorous examination is required all round. Something clearly went horribly wrong when those good leaders, and others like them, either failed to hold their seats or merely scraped through.

One colleague of mine is insistent that the JLP lost this general election when we won the September 3, 2007 general election. Despite over a year of campaigning then, including a huge advertising and media programme, an incumbent PNP administration that went over 18 consecutive years in office with pressure from highly publicised scandals and internal division, albeit under a still popular leader in the form of Portia Simpson Miller, the JLP managed to win only 32 seats to the PNP's 28. Then, the party should have carried out a most comprehensive assessment into the marginal win and, thereafter, set a clear programme of work that would seek to mend gaps in the JLP's machinery.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CHALLENGES

While there was some analysis, nothing comprehensive was done. The party simply expended most of its energies into the governing of the country's affairs forthwith. The series of challenges that came one after another for the new administration are too many to list here.

But we certainly recall the immediate and difficult economic and social circumstances from the get-go: the floods and landslides, the food crisis, the oil crisis, dual-citizenship challenges and, to top it all off, the biggest global economic crisis in 70 years, leading to the subsequent ravaging of an already ravaged economy, and we could go on and on.

As if that wasn't enough, the administration descended into the ruinous Dudus extradition/ Manatt saga that drained 22 months of the Government's precious 51 months with a barrage of negative headlines and news stories that seriously disfigured an already marginal administration.

G2K, at this time, based on the complex internal and external circumstances, transformed into an aggressive communications arm of the JLP that saw it defending highly unpopular issues in a turbid media environment.

Despite the toxic environment, the Government's achievements have been heralded internationally and locally. From the general stabilisation of the Jamaican economy, to critical and successful reforms to education and health, to the big gains in tourism and agriculture, the marked reduction in crime and violence, the returning sense of law and order to the movement of good-willed governance reforms. The list of achievements is long, but was overshadowed by the deluge of negatives out there.

WHAT HAPPENED?

The resignation of Bruce Golding on September 25 and the elevation of a young, articulate, intelligent, sober and, importantly, popular Andrew Holness to the seat of leader and prime minister, immediately heralded a reversal in the party's flagging fortunes, certainly if we use the polls and the general feeling coming from the ground as a guide.

Unfortunately, mere days and weeks into the new dispensation, the Holness-led Government had to battle highly publicised concerns about JDIP, a spy plane and other developments that injured the administration's already severely battered credibility and trust foundations.

The media have been flooded with varying opinions and views as to why the JLP lost the election. It was, in fact, a surprise to many inside and outside the JLP. All views will have to be carefully assessed before a final determination can be made as to the actual reasons. Some of the more plausible arguments are:

1. The possible outmanoeuvring of the JLP when it came to enumeration. The PNP pushed hard for an election not to be called if the more than 42,000 new electors on the last list were not accommodated. So much so that press conferences and interviews were the order of the day. After a detailed analysis, we will know whether this was a factor or not.

2. Several candidates failed in sufficiently organising and building their political machinery. Some, in fact, were detached from the base and are guilty of neglect and arrogance.

3. New JLP candidates had insufficient time to turn around flagging fortunes in constituencies that were already marked by the JLP as being problematic.

4. Voter turnout was low at 52.65 per cent. Undecided/uncommitted voters, by and large, didn't vote.

5. The effects of the global economic crisis and the subsequent local economic challenges fed into high levels of frustration, desperation and anger among voters. Bottom-line bread-and-butter issues trumped talk about economic stabilisation policies, abolition of hospital user fees and other successful initiatives of the JLP Government. In the end, the bread-and-butter JEEP was sold.

6. The effects of the 22 month-long Dudus-Manatt debacle severely strained the Government's credibility and trust foundations, thus alienating significant portions of the electorate, many of whom were already turned off from the political process from the get-go. It was also a huge distraction for the party, leaving day-to-day ground management woefully lacking.

7. Many voters insisted on being paid before voting for the JLP. This denied crucial votes for several candidates and was a widespread challenge. The demands of the Christmas season caused further burden on candidates.

8. PNP candidates and their respective machinery were cash-rich at the final lap of the campaign and expended handsomely to win over some voters.

There are other factors that played nationally and locally at varying levels that a comprehensive report would, no doubt, highlight.

AD CAMPAIGN

As it relates to the JLP/G2K advertising campaign, I hereby put on record that while I sat as a member of the advertising committee, albeit at a late stage, many things happened which caused discomfort on my part. But I must, in the end, accept collective responsibility. It was decided that the JLP-stamped ads would, of course, focus on the achievements of the Government's time in office and the vision and plan going forward, while G2K-stamped ads would highlight the perceived negatives and/or deficiencies of the PNP.

This dual and fairly distinct approach is the norm for modern-day political campaigns across the globe. While the G2K ads were the most popular, most-humorous and most-watched ads during the campaign, it is clear that they became far too dominant and incongruous, resulting in an advertising campaign that wasn't effectively balanced.

I am confident that the full and comprehensive report into the JLP's campaign and electoral defeat will comment extensively on issues of timing, management, rotation, messaging, financing and coordination for our advertising campaign.

In the end, the JLP will be a stronger and better party. We are all deeply hurt, but we must take the lessons from this defeat and brush off, reform, refocus and rebuild in the interest of preserving our democracy and making Jamaica a better place for all.

I will be doing so in the interest of the JLP and, most important, my country, Jamaica.

Delano Seiveright is president of G2K, the young-professional affiliate of the JLP.