Editorial | Jamaica after Guaidó

In a development foreshadowed for many months, the Biden administration finally threw Juan Guaidó under the bus. For Mr Guaidó’s removal as Venezuela’s so-called interim president, as well as dismantling of the opposition’s shadow government, couldn’t happen without the imprimatur of the United States.

It must be clear now that Jamaica should begin to unfreeze its own relations with Venezuela, rather than jeopardise its interests while powerful countries protect theirs.

Mr Guaidó used to be the president of Venezuela’s national assembly. In 2019, backed by the United States and Western governments which claimed President Nicolás Maduro’s re-election to be illegitimate, Mr Guaidó declared himself interim president and leader of a parallel government. He was recognised by more than 50 countries.

While Jamaica never formally endorsed Mr Guaidó’s “presidency”, its political support of his arrangement was clear. Kingston, for example, acted in concert with the Lima Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries that attempted to pressure Mr Maduro over the disputed elections and voted in favour of seating Mr Guaidó’s representative at the Organization of American States (OAS), even though Caracas announced its withdrawal from the organisation.

Separately, Jamaica has been in dispute with the Maduro government over what price it should pay for the renationalised 49 per cent of the Petrojam oil refinery that was owned by Venezuela’s national oil, Petróleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA. Ironically, though, Jamaica appears not to have attempted to negotiate with the Guaidó ‘government’ over the issue, preferring to put the money it was willing to pay for the Petrojam asset in an escrow account.

BADLY FRAYED

Over the past two years, the consensus around Mr Guaidó’s ‘presidency’ became badly frayed. He lost popularity at home and made little headway in dislodging the Maduro government.

The ascent of centre and left of centre administrations in Latin America, and the Russia-Ukraine war, which unleashed a global energy crisis, further weakened Mr Guaidó.

For example, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, St Lucia, and Guyana jumped ship on the Lima Group and last October, 19 of the OAS’ 35 members (if you count Cuba, which hasn’t participated in the organisation for more than half-a-century, and Venezuela, whose de facto government had previously renounced its membership) voted in favour of rescinding the resolution to seat Mr Guaidó’s envoy. Further, several Western governments have been quietly re-engaging Mr Maduro, in some instances reopening embassies in Caracas.

More critical, however, has been the posture of the United States. Early in his presidency, Joe Biden opened back channel talks with the Maduro government. Some Americans jailed in Venezuela have been released.

Then in November, the Biden administration agreed that the US oil company, Chevron, could resume limited oil production in Venezuela, even though income due to Caracas from the oil sales would be used to offset PDVSA’s debt to the American firm.

Parallel with America’s easing of the oil sanctions, the Maduro government and the opposition agreed around US$3 billion of Venezuelan money held by foreign governments would be unfrozen and transferred to a United Nations-managed fund for humanitarian relief for Venezuelans.

These developments culminated with the November 30 decision by a large majority of the parallel assembly to remove Mr Guaidó as ‘interim president’ and dissolve his government. They subsequently appointed a three-member commission of exiled female legislators to manage those Venezuelan assets abroad, over which foreign governments previously gave Mr Guaidó control.

The opposition groups that engineered Mr Guaidó’s ouster argued that the interim government was “no longer useful and … of no interest to citizens”. They clearly believed that in the circumstances, their best option for dislodging Mr Maduro is by preparing now for elections in 2024.

But given that the interim government drew much of its oxygen from the United States, America’s reaction would have weighed greatly on their decision.

NO EASY PASS

No one expects Washington to give Mr Maduro an easy pass in their complex relationship. But America’s near- to medium-term concern is the cost of energy, especially if, in the face of sanctions, more Russian oil leaves the market. The high cost of gasolene at the pumps during the first half of 2022 rattled Americans. Mr Biden, who has his eyes on re-election in 2024, wouldn’t find it enjoyable if repeated. Finding a way for Venezuelan oil to flow again is in America’s interest.

Jamaica has a stake in this matter. The United States, as close friend and partner, will appreciate that Kingston must also attend to what is in its best interest.

Jamaica was among the countries that received oil from Venezuela on preferential terms under its PetroCaribe arrangement before the scheme collapsed when sanctions left Venezuela without sufficient oil to meet the PetroCaribe obligations.

In Jamaica’s case, the matter was fettered by additional complications, including the shuttering of each other’s embassy in Caracas and Kingston, although diplomatic relations were not broken.

It is in Jamaica’s interest that it begins a reset of its relations with Venezuela. Indeed, the Venezuelan opposition recognised that time was up on the burlesque farce of Mr Guaidó’s ‘government’ and that there were better ways to influence the dynamics on the ground.

Others, including the United States, have begun to re-engage Venezuela. There is no rational reason for Jamaica to find itself at the back of the queue.