David Salmon | An elected executive president? No, thank you!

For months, discussions on constitutional reform have concentrated on the structure a reorganised government would take. While many are attracted to the allure of a US-style presidential system, I am not. I would even argue that attempting to replicate this form of administration would not solve any of our governance issues, and would be a disaster for effective public management and accountability.

Critics of the current Westminster governance model have often posited that it is an inherited, colonial institution that must be replaced. Based on this argument, how does importing a governance framework from the United States achieve the purpose of creating an indigenous governance model?

On a less pedantic level, an imported presidential system addresses none of the present challenges created by our current governance framework. The challenges often highlighted include the excessive powers of the prime minister, the lack of accountability of elected representatives, the partisan nature of governance, and the divide between the political electorate and voters. For each of these challenges, the executive presidency fails to deliver.

EXCESSIVE POWER

Opponents have argued that under the current arrangement, the prime minister can steamroll his Cabinet and the legislature with ease. The argument goes that with an executive president, the legislature can be separated from the executive branch, which ensures greater accountability. This argument, while logically sound, is fundamentally flawed.

The accountability that is desired can almost only be achieved if an opposing party controls the legislature. This is never guaranteed in any election cycle. In Jamaica, apart from the 2016 general election, our governments usually have very healthy majorities in both seat count and the popular vote. Hence, a divided government, where opposing parties control the executive and legislature, is highly unlikely.

Alternatively, when one party controls these two branches of government, it is extremely difficult to hold the president accountable. That is why American presidents who have been impeached have never been convicted, as the majority party, led by the president, has little incentive to remove their electoral standard-bearer. That happened in 1998, 2019 and 2021.

In fact, you are more likely to see an empowered president when his party controls the legislature. El Salvador, under President Nayib Bukele, illustrates this case. For two years, Bukele’s crime-fighting agenda was hamstrung by an opposition-controlled assembly elected prior to his presidency.

Since his party decisively won the 2021 legislative elections, El Salvador’s legislature has approved the suspension of constitutional rights, dismissed oppositional judges, and has empowered the president to enact any legislation he deems necessary to execute his agenda. Therefore, the argument that excessive executive power can be curtailed simply by separating the legislature from the executive is farcical.

REDUCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION

Another point made to support the executive presidency model is that the strict separation of powers reduces opportunities for corruption. This fails to consider the additional powers an executive president would now assume.

As it stands, the governor general possesses certain reserved powers that would have to be transferred to an executive president. One such power is the ability to pardon convicted individuals. Presently, the governor general, acting in consultation with his Privy Council, can determine whether a convicted person should receive a pardon or a less severe punishment.

Under the executive president, where both ceremonial and governance roles are held by one individual, a politically aligned head of state would now possess this power. This power would have to be bestowed upon said individual, to ensure that the three branches of government can effectively check and balance the other.

Having a politically aligned individual with the ability to pardon people ignores the Jamaican reality, where there is a high perception of government corruption. The potential abuse of this power represents a very real threat. This has already happened in countries such as Brazil, where its previous president, Jair Bolsonaro, pardoned a political ally convicted of inciting violence against Supreme Court judges. There is no reason why this cannot happen locally.

DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

Furthermore, as in other jurisdictions, the president can veto laws passed by the legislature. This is a well-established power that an executive president would possess. If an elected president vetoes a law passed by an elected congress, then who exactly is right. Both branches of the government would have legitimacy.

Proponents of this arrangement would argue that this encourages cooperation between an opposition-controlled congress and a ruling president. This is an admirable but inherently naïve viewpoint. What incentives would the party out of office have to work with a president from an opposing party? This is especially if both campaigned on opposing platforms.

The Obama administration provided an apt example that demonstrates this challenge in practice. Obama revealed on page 258 of his latest book, The Promise Land, “For all their talk about wanting politicians to get along, American voters rarely reward the opposition for cooperating with the governing party.” For this reason, Obama had to rely on support from the Democratic caucus to pass his landmark legislation, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The bill was largely voted along party lines despite the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis.

History repeated itself in 2021, where the Democrats relied on their razor-thin Senate majority to pass Joe Biden’s $1.9-trillion COVID-19 American Rescue Plan. Jamaica is no stranger to partisan behaviour, and there is no reason why changing our governance model would alter these dynamics.

In December 2022, Peru’s President Pedro Castillo became so frustrated by his inability to achieve his mandate due to the opposition-controlled congress, that he attempted to dissolve the body until new legislative elections could be held. Congress, in turn, struck back and had him removed from office. Based on our history, Jamaica is more likely to demonstrate these same challenges shared by several Latin American countries.

A major elephant in the room is that parliamentary systems are inherently more stable because of the ability of the executive to achieve its mandate. Consequently, any identified example of democratic backsliding is likely to occur in countries with executive presidents. Despite its flaws, Jamaica has been an oasis of relative political stability for 61 years. Let’s not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

This is important, as Jamaicans primarily elect their leaders to improve their standard of living. The implementation of a US-styled governance model would impair the government’s ability to carry out this objective, as it is simply not nimble enough. The model also leads to the perception that electing one individual can automatically improve the overall performance of government. That is simply nonsense. Having a leader who can get legislation through to execute policies is what is desirable, not someone who can make pledges to an electorate and hope that congress passes it.

REFORMS THAT MAKE SENSE

Are there elements of the US governance system that I do like? Yes, there certainly is. For one, both the House of Representatives and the Senate are well funded, and there is an army of staffers who serve as researchers and help Congress members maintain their connection with constituents.

Additionally, the committee system in the United States is very strong. This same can be said for the United Kingdom. Although, with the head of our Parliament’s Public Administration and Appropriations Committee (PAAC) threatening to end proceedings of this oversight body due to the absence of a quorum, we are still far away from achieving an empowered legislature.

Adopting a different constitutional framework does not mean that a parliament would automatically be empowered to carry out its functions. How does changing a system with the same people produce different outcomes, when the political incentives remain the same?

Other reforms that can actually succeed in improving the responsiveness of the executive to constituents’ needs include the ability to recall members of parliament. However, giving a president a four-to-five-year mandate and then insulating him from the day-to-day operations of parliament is a sure way to get a tone-deaf leader.

Nevertheless, I am comforted by the fact that it does not look like the Constitutional Reform Committee is moving in that direction. It is important to be mindful of making shifts to appease extremely vocal individuals who may argue certain perspectives without fully examining the ramifications of their prescriptions.

David Salmon is Jamaica’s 2023 Rhodes Scholar. Send feedback to davidsalmon@live.com and columns@gleanerjm.com.