Court of Appeal reduces life sentence for cabbie convicted of manslaughter
A taxi operator who was wrongfully sentenced to life in prison for the 2012 killing of the father of one of his ex-partner’s children will now serve 14 years in prison.
The Court of Appeal last month overturned the life sentence handed down to Jermaine Minott, stating it was legally incorrect.
Minott, 41, had originally been sentenced to life with eligibility for parole after 13 years, following his conviction for manslaughter in January 2018.
Minott was initially charged with murder, but the jury instead convicted him of manslaughter.
The key facts of the case centre around an incident on September 21, 2012, when Minott went to his ex-partner Aneika Richardson’s home in Riverton City, Kingston. Richardson had informed him that Omar White, who was the father of her child, was there. A confrontation ensued, and White was fatally shot.
Minott testified that he had received a call from Richardson, with whom he had been living, warning him that White was at her home threatening to kill her and possibly had a gun. Minott said he rushed home and upon arrival, heard what sounded like arguing. He saw White at the front of the yard and Richardson at the back.
Minott said he enquired from White why he was there, and he started cursing and “bend up his face”.
The taxi operator testified further that White then moved towards him and appeared to reach for something at his waist. He said he tried to shove White, and a struggle ensued.
According to Minott, he saw a gun in White’s hand and tried to take it from him, but then heard a shot.
Minott said he was frightened and ran to his car and drove away.
In contrast, Richardson, who provided evidence for the Crown, claimed that Minott arrived and told White “to come out a di woman yard” after stating he came to visit his daughter. She said White agreed to leave, but as he moved towards the gate, Minott grabbed him and “shoved him”.
WITNESS ACCOUNTS
According to Richardson, Minott then pulled a gun from under his shirt and shot White. She said she never saw White with a weapon or witnessed any aggression from him. Afterwards, she testified that Minott called her to apologise “fi kill Omar” and that he had not got over it.
Richardson, who had denied living with Minott, however, admitted under cross-examination that before the incident, she had asked Minott to move in because she was fearful of White.
She also testified that when she had called Minott on the day, she did not do so for him “to return and do anything”. She only wanted to let him know that White was there as she did not know if he would be returning soon.
Minott appealed his sentence and conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge’s failure to fully examine the case and properly guide the jury. He also contended that she failed miserably in the summing-up of the case and gave confusing definitions on the various aspects of the law: self-defence, provocation, honest belief, accident, murder and manslaughter, resulting in an unfair and unreasonable verdict.
His lawyer, Melrose Reid, argued that the judge had not pointed out the “lurking doubts” in the case, which, she argued, allowed the conviction to stand despite the lack of evidence meeting the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reid highlighted issues with the forensic evidence, such as the uncertainty of how White was shot and inconsistencies between the Crown’s case and Richardson’s testimony. She argued that the jury’s verdict was “palpably wrong”.
The appellate judges, however, dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge had appropriately directed the jury regarding self-defence, provocation, and other relevant matters. However, they found that the life sentence for manslaughter was incorrect, given the circumstances, and reduced Minott’s sentence to 16 years in prison. Two years were deducted for time already served.
The judges emphasised that the lurking doubt principle was inapplicable in this case and upheld the trial judge’s directions as appropriate. They concluded that while the judge’s decision to allow manslaughter to be considered by the jury may have been an error, it did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice.